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LEGAL ETHICS: DISCRETION AND UTILITY
IN MODEL RULE 1.6
Charles A. Kelbley*
I. Introduction
The legal profession has recently been subjected to much searching
and sometimes unfair criticism of its ethical foundations.' Recent
proposals for new Model Rules of Professional Conduct2 (Rules)
have added to this controversy.' Before making additional criticisms
of legal ethics, however, a few prefatory remarks may serve to
remind us of the nature of the lawyer's high calling.
The practice of law by its very nature requires lawyers to abide
by an extraordinary and extremely demanding set of ethical rules4
without parallel in other professional endeavors.' Significantly, no
* Associate Professor of Philosophy, Fordham University. A.B. 1959, John
Carroll University; M.A. 1961, Loyola University (Chicago); Fulbright Scholar 1961-
1963, Sorbonne; Ph.D 1968, Sorbonne; J.D. 1982, Fordham University School of
Law. Law Clerk to Honorable Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., President Judge, Superior
Court of Pennsylvania, 1982-1983. The author wishes to thank Charles A. Thrall,
Esq., and professors Robert Johann and Christopher Gowans for their helpful
comments on this Article.
1. See, e.g., G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW xii-xiv (1978) (while
lawyers' ethics "have always been the subject of popular anxiety and suspicion,"
the public has recently become even more distrustful of the legal profession as a
repository of "special power, authority [and] duty") [hereinafter cited as HAZARD].
2. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as RULES].
3. See supra General Introduction to the accompanying series of Articles on
Rule 1.6 [hereinafter cited as General Introduction]; see also At Issue, 69 A.B.A.J.
866 (1983); Lawyer's Disclosure Act Still Under Study, 69 A.B.A.J. 1632 (1983)
(discussing proposed Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure Act of 1983, S.485, which would
have added to federal mail fraud statute provision requiring lawyers to disclose to
federal authorities when client intends to commit crime or fraud and the lawyer
has used mails to further this conduct); Ethics Fight: Round 2: The Model Rules
Face Rocky Road, 6 NAT'L L.J. 1 (1984); Pressman, A.B.A. Rejects Plan to Widen
Lawyers' 'Whistle-Blowing,' L.A. Daily J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Professional
Responsibility: O.P.M. Forces Counsel to Ponder Limits of Disclosure, 5 LEGAL
TIMES WASH. 14 (1983); States May Balk at Changing Laws on Lawyer Ethics, 96
L.A. DAILY J. 1 (1983).
4. Lawyers' conduct is governed not only by "individual conscience [and]
vaguely articulated 'traditions of the profession,"' but also by regulations, or
"positive law," which provide ethical guidelines with which lawyers must comply.
HAZARD, supra note 1, at 5; see CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979)
[hereinafter cited as CODE]. Violation of the Disciplinary Rules provided by the
Code may be the basis for sanctions such as reprimand, suspension, or disbarment
of the lawyer. HAZARD, supra note 1, at 6.
5. See, e.g., Should He Have Let Client Lie?, 7 NAT'L L.J. 5 (1984) (attorney
who believed he had duty to advise court his client would commit perjury held
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other profession requires practitioners to identify so closely and
completely with the interests and confidences of their clients. 6 The
explanation is fairly simple: by definition an attorney "act[s] in the
place or stead of another."' In contrast, physicians and religious
professionals do not adopt the point of view of their clients or
patients. The very nature of their relationship to clients allows them
to maintain more distance and independence of thought and action
toward their clients' problems and perspectives.' While non-legal
professionals may provide remedies, admonish, and counsel reform
or prudence, in their professions an adversary relation is built directly
into the professional-client relationship. 9 Seldom must they represent
a client outside the privacy of their consulting rooms. Whatever
information they learn will more often than not remain internal to
the relationship. That is the normal, constitutive nature of most
non-legal professional encounters.' 0
by Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals to have gone too far, thereby violating client's
constitutional rights to fair trial and effective assistance of counsel, as well as duty
of confidentiality) (discussing State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978)).
6. See 1-2 SOCIAL RESPONSIB3LITY: JOURNALISM, LAW, MEDICINE (Hodges ed.
1975-1976).
7. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (5th ed. 1979); see also BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 49 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BAYLES].
8. The differences presented here between the legal profession and other profes-
sions derive largely from conceptual analysis. For discussions of these differences,
see, e.g., HAZARD, supra note 1, at 151 (unlike lawyers, accountants see themselves
as judges of their clients; doctors make decisions for their patients); BAYLES, supra
note 7, at 49 ("[alttorneys are supposed to represent their clients' interests against
those of others") (emphasis in original).
9. From a purely conceptual point of view, this is most obvious in the medical
profession. Doctors, dentists and psychiatrists, for example, normally counsel pa-
tients as individuals. Significantly, whether or not their counsel is followed generally
will not directly affect others' rights. Indeed, in an imaginary two-person universe,
comprising one doctor and one other person, it would still make sense for the
solitary person to consult the doctor for the sake of mental or physical health.
Similarly, the profession of teaching could also exist in a two-person universe, as
long as one individual had something to communicate to the other. Even a one-
person universe, comprising a solitary journalist-historian, makes sense for the
purpose of recording the events of the natural universe. While professions such as
banking and accounting seem to require a more numerous populace, there is no
inherent reason why their elementary principles could not apply in a primitive
fashion within a two-person universe. In contrast, the legal profession is more
dependent upon a numerous populace, because one ordinarily consults a lawyer to
protect one's rights as against some third party. While this implies the need for
at least a three-person universe, further reflection suggests that other institutional
supports are necessary for the client to assert his rights and benefit from the
lawyer's advice. Thus the functions of law-making, adjudication and enforcement
imply a number of persons beyond the original three-person universe. In this sense
law seems to be the most social and adversarial of professions.
10. For comparisons between lawyers and other professionals, see GOLDMAN,
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The relationship between the lawyer and his client differs from
that between other professionals and their clients in at least one
crucial respect. The relationship is, in essence, always on the verge
of drawing other parties into an adversarial relationship with the
client, requiring the attorney to "act in the place or stead" of his
client.1 ' Since lawyers often "represent" others in the public forum,
the information they learn from clients must be treated in precisely
the same manner in which their clients regard it.l2 This explains the
unusual moral rules of the legal profession. Unlike physicians, priests,
rabbis, ministers, and numerous other professionals, the lawyer is
not simply an adviser but an advocate too.
It is the role of advocate that engenders the deepest perplexities
of legal ethics. 3 On the one hand, this role creates the need for an
extraordinary set of ethical rules that non-lawyers do not generally
need in order to lead an ethical, professional life. 4 On the other
hand, these rules often conflict, or at least seem to conflict, with
ordinary ethics.' 5 Failure to reconcile legal with ordinary ethics is
responsible for much of the persistent criticism of the legal profession. 16
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 143, 286 (corporate managers),
158, 172, 189-90, 227-28, 284-85 (doctors), 129-30, 140, 144 (judges), 286-87 (jour-
nalists), 287-88 (teachers and professors) (1980) [hereinafter cited as GOLDMAN]. See
generally BAYLES, supra note 7. It might be argued that the profession of social
work requires an even higher, qualitative identification with clients than that required
of lawyers. The effective social worker must be capable of empathy, sympathy and
charity, which are forms of identification not required for effective legal repre-
sentation. Moreover, the social worker's underlying motive is often altruism, some-
thing that is doubtless less common in lawyers.
11. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Lawyers may also be employed
to avoid litigation by helping clients to avoid violating others' rights and by advising
them as to how to perform their duties. These functions anticipate the lawyer's
role in the adversary process. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. See R. REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE LIGHT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES
97 (1943) [hereinafter cited as REGAN].
13. See supra note 5.
14. See RULES, supra note 2; General Introduction, supra note 3.
15. Ordinary ethics means the body of principles and rules governing the moral
conduct of human affairs in general, including professional relationships. Whenever
professional ethics deviates from ordinary ethics a conflict arises calling for jus-
tification of the deviation. For the purposes of this Article, if the professional rule
does not justify a deviation, that is a "violation" of ordinary ethics. This Article
contends that Rule 1.6 violates ordinary ethics. See also BAYLES, supra note 7, at
16-17; GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at 99ff; THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES
AND LAWYERS' ETHICS 1-4 (Luban ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as THE GOOD LAWYER].
16. See HAZARD, supra note 1, at 1 ("ineradicable suspicion" of lawyers in
folklore and popular opinion); BAYLES, supra note 7, at 5 ("public contempt for
lawyers stems . . . from their adherence to an unethical code of ethics . . ."),
citing J.K. LIEBERMAN, CRISIS AT THE BAR: LAWYERS' UNETHICAL ETHICS AND WHAT
TO Do ABOUT IT 15-16 (1978); GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at 90ff; Luban, The
Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 15, at 83-122.
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In response to that criticism, legal ethics must justify and explain
legal practices to satisfy an increasingly curious and critical public.
Legal ethics today are undoubtedly disturbing to the average cit-
izen. 1 7 Even philosophers who are concerned with ethics find the
subject puzzling." Questions such as the following are frequently
posed: How can a lawyer defend a client known by the lawyer to
be guilty? How can a lawyer justify destroying the credibility of an
adverse witness when the lawyer knows the witness is telling the
truth? Do lawyers really deserve a third or more of large jury
verdicts in medical malpractice actions? 19 Citizens and academicians,
moreover, are rarely satisfied with answers that emphasize the pe-
culiar nature of legal ethics. No matter how valid the answers are,
non-lawyers continue to criticize legal practices that violate ordinary
moral rules and find it very difficult to justify such violations. 20
Proposed Model Rule 1.6 (Rule 1.6 or the Rule) has become a
focal point for this dilemma.21 One side of the controversy asserts
17. See supra note 16 and sources cited therein.
18. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals. Some Moral Issues, in ETHICAL
THEORY AND BUSINESS 325-27 (Beauchamp and Bowie eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited
as Wasserstrom]; Williams, Professional Morality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD
LAWYER, supra note 15, at 259-69; GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at 90-156.
19. These questions are beyond the scope of this Article. However, satisfactory
discussions are available. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 43-49 (1975) (impeaching truthful witness through cross-examination) [here-
inafter cited as FREEDMAN]; Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
175 (1983-84) [hereinafter cited as Babcock] (Professor Babcock begins article by
observing: "How can you defend a person you know is guilty? I have answered
that question hundreds of times, never to my inquirer's satisfaction, and therefore
never to my own."); Laufer, Of Ethics and Economics: Contingent Percentage
Fees for Legal Services, 16 AKRON L. REV. 747 (1982-83); Wolfram, A Lawyer's
Duty to Represent Clients, Repugnant and Otherwise, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra
note 15, at 214-35.
20. This conclusion is based in part on the author's experiences with students
and professors who frequently ask questions such as those mentioned above. See
Wasserstrom, supra note 18, at 325-37; Babcock, supra note 19.
Criticism of legal ethics is by no means expressed only by non-lawyers. The
author's informal survey suggests that numerous lawyers either do not take "legal
ethics" seriously or believe that "legal ethics" are not meant to be taken seriously,
regardless of their personal views. A federal judge once said, off the record and
perhaps not completely seriously, that legal ethics is an "epistle of straw." See
infra note 25 for definition; see also FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at vii-ix; Kutak,
The Adversary System and the Practice of Law, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note
15, at 172-87; HAZARD, supra note 1, at 1. For a critical review and evaluation
of Professional Responsibility courses in American law schools, see Ackerman, Law
Schools and Professional Responsibility: A Task for All Seasons, 88 DICK. L. REV.
202-20 (1984).
21. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text. Rule 1.6 states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of
a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
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that a lawyer, as an officer of the court, should be required to
disclose a client's intention to commit a murder. 22 Advocates of this
view say that merely permitting a lawyer to disclose such information
(as Rule 1.6 would provide) tears at the fabric that unites both
citizens and lawyers in a single moral universe. 23 If the law is truly
a learned profession, it should maintain better contact with that
universe. Opponents of the mandatory disclosure requirement would
adopt a permissive standard, possibly similar to that of Rule 1.6.24
A satisfactory conclusion to this controversy will be forthcoming
only when the demands of professional ethics can be integrated with
the principles of ordinary moral discourse. To the extent that a gap
remains, legal ethics will continue to be perceived by outsiders as
an "epistle of straw," 2 a perception that unfortunately is shared
by all too many lawyers. 26
The Rules purport to give lawyers "professional discretion" to
disclose the secrets or confidences of a client.2 7 Analysis of Rule
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,
and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing
a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm; or (2) to establish a claim or defense
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against
the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's rep-
resentation of the client.
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6.
22. See infra note 23.
23. For a report on the March 1984 Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) conference
on legal ethics which describes views that support either a mandatory or permissive
disclosure rule, see [Current Reports Binder] ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON PROF.
CONDUCT 117-20 (Mar. 21, 1984) [herinafter cited as ABA/BNA MANUAL. But
see Comment, Proposed Model Rule 1.6: Its Effect on a Lawyer's Moral and
Ethical Decisions With Regard to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 35 BAYLOR L.
REV. 561, 577 (1983) ("A disclosure rule must be flexible enough to allow for
unforeseen circumstances yet strict enough to prevent abuse." Such a rule "needs
a person to weigh all the variables; the client's interests and the third party's in-
terests who [sic] might be harmed must be balanced.") [hereinafter cited as Com-
ment, Proposed Rule 1.6].
24. See supra note 23; see also Wick, Lawyer-Client Confidentiality: Have We
Clamped Down the Lid Too Much?, 51 INs. CoUNs. J. 244 (1984) (Rule 1.6 overly
restricts attorneys' ability to disclose).
25. See supra note 20. By an "epistle of straw" is meant a teaching that is
ineffective, either because it is not intended to be taken seriously or because it is
largely ignored by those to whom it was meant to apply.
26. See supra note 20.
27. See RULES, supra note 2, Preamble and Comment (Disclosure Adverse to
Client under Rule 1.6, Confidentiality of Information). In general, for the purposes
1985]
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1.6 suggests, however, that in some cases where a lawyer chooses
not to disclose, there is no exercise of professional discretion at all.
Indeed, a consideration of several hypothetical cases leads to the
conclusion that Rule 1.6 invites a lawyer to make unethical or
arbitrary decisions .21
On its face, Rule 1.6 is controversial because of the language in
section (b)(1) which provides that "[a] lawyer may reveal such
information [relating to representation of a client] to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from com-
mitting a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm . . .,29
The language of Rule 1.6 creates two problems: (1) whether the
Rule's permissive nature can be justified; and (2) whether it is
reasonable to limit permissible disclosures to crimes involving im-
minent death or substantial bodily injury. There is also a more basic
problem created by the Rules' Preamble and the comment to Rule
1.6 concerning discernment of the meaning of "professional dis-
cretion" in light of the utilitarian ethic on which the Rule depends.
These problems will be examined in this article.30
Based on the resources of informal logic, ethics and legal phi-
of this Article, the terms "secrets,' ''confidences" and "information" mean "in-
formation," the term with the broadest meaning, without attending to their more
specific meanings in the CODE, supra note 4, or in the RULES, supra note 2. These
distinctions are not immediately relevant to this Article.
28. See infra Section II.A for a discussion of four hypothetical cases which
indicate problems with Rule 1.6.
29. RULES, supra note 2. Rule 1.6 refers twice to what a lawyer "believes."
Section (b), in discussing the extent of disclosure, refers to what a lawyer "reasonably
believes" which is an objective standard. However, subsection (b)(1), in discussing
the substantive basis for disclosure, refers to what a lawyer "believes," which
would appear to be a more subjective standard. This latter provision may affect
the standard of evidence that a lawyer must satisfy in order to justify disclosure.
See infra note 51 and text accompanying note 128; see also supra note 21 for
complete text of Rule 1.6.
The text of Rule 1.6 appears to conflict with the Rule's comment. While the
text states that a lawyer may disclose if he "believes" a client's criminal act will
result in imminent death or serious bodily harm, RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b)(1),
the comment says "[tihe lawyer may make a disclosure in order to prevent homicide
or serious bodily injury which the lawyer reasonably believes is intended by a
client." RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6 comment (emphasis added). Comments, the
Rules tell us, "are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule
is authoritative." Id. at Scope. In light of this conflict, this Article will refer to
what a lawyer "reasonably believes," rather than to the more subjective "believes."
The reader should therefore be alerted to the possibility that the text of Rule 1.6
may mean "reasonably believes."
30. See infra Section 1.B for a discussion of the problem of discretion, and
Section IV.A for a discussion of utilitarianism. This Article criticizes the reliance
by Rule 1.6 on discretion and utility, and argues that a purely permissive rule is
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losophy,3' this Article argues that the Rule should be reformulated. 2
While the argument does not purport to be flawless, it, hopefully,
will provoke the legal profession to evaluate Rule 1.6 more critically
before adopting it.
The Article assumes that secrets and confidential information are
necessary to the structure of human personality and are justified by
a number of ethical and psychological principles.33 Assuming, then,
that secrets and confidences may sometimes be desirable, the crucial
problem is defining their limits.
I. The Test of Logic
Rule 1.6 does not obligate a lawyer to disclose client confidences
or secrets to prevent serious crimes.34 Instead, the Rule and its
accompanying comment, in conjunction with the Preamble to the
Rules, give a lawyer discretion to disclose information under quite
limited conditions." If these conditions do obtain, the lawyer remains
free not to disclose even if disclosure would prevent death or sub-
stantial bodily injury. A rule permitting such consequences requires
strong justification because it permits a lawyer to do nothing even
though he reasonably believes 6 that his client's criminal act will
result in death or substantial bodily injury.
Unfortunately, the foregoing outcome appears to reflect the true
intent of those who drafted the Rules. Two provisions in the Rules
suggest that the drafters not only allowed for this result but actually
intended it. First, the comment to Rule 1.6 states that "[a] lawyer's
decision not to take preventive action permitted by paragraph (b)(l)
does not violate this Rule." 37 This unambiguous statement allows
not justified. See infra Section V. For criticism of the limited application of Rule
1.6 to crimes involving death or substantial bodily injury, see infra id.
31. See infra Sections II, III and IV.
32. See infra Section V.
33. Although these principles are interesting subjects for philosophical exami-
nation, they are beyond the scope of this Article. For a recent and comprehensive
treatment of the general subject of the human need for secrets and confidences,
see S. BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION (1982)
[hereinafter cited as BOK]; see also W. BIER, PRIVACY: A VANISHING VALUE? (1980).
34. See RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6.
35. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
36. See supra note 29 for a discussion of the conflict between the text of Rule
1.6, which refers to a lawyer's "belief," and the comment to the Rule, which
refers to a lawyer's "reasonable belief."
37. RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6 comment (Disclosure Adverse to Client).
Much of the debate over the Rules concerns whether certain disclosures of con-
fidential information should be allowed, and under what circumstances disclosure
is warranted. See Rose, N.J. Adopts Code Tougher than A.B.A. 's, 7 NAT'L L.J.
19851
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no other interpretation. Second, two statements in the Scope section
of the Rules reinforce this conclusion.38 One statement provides that
rules cast in the term "may" are "permissive and define areas under
the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion. No dis-
ciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to
act or acts within the bounds of such discretion." 9 The Scope
section also states that "[tihe lawyer's exercise of discretion not to
disclose information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to reex-
amination. Permitting such re-examination would be incompatible
with the general policy of promoting compliance with law through
assurances that communications will be protected against disclo-
sure. ''40
These provisions make clear that a lawyer's exercise of professional
discretion under Rule 1.6 can be the subject of reexamination only
when the lawyer makes a disclosure. 4 A decision against disclosure
will not be reexamined and the lawyer will not be subject to discipline.
A. Four Hypothetical Cases
The following four hypothetical cases illustrate potential results
under the Rule.
1. Case A
A client whose case is going badly tells his lawyer that he intends
to kill the judge in charge of his case. After vigorously counseling
the client not to carry out his plan, the lawyer, believing the client
is serious, discloses the client's intention. Before his arrest, the client
changes his mind, follows the lawyer's advice and abandons the
plan. The client is later prosecuted for criminal conspiracy. Model
Rules Analysis: The lawyer made a decision on the basis of a
reasonable belief, acted ethically, and is not subject to discipline.
3 (1984). The Bar has traditionally believed that strict confidentiality in the lawyer-
client relationship was integral to the sixth amendment right to counsel and the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Freedman, Lawyer-Client Con-
fidences: The Model Rules' Radical Assault on Tradition, 68 A.B.A. J. 428, 430
(1982).
38. RULES, supra note 2, Scope.
39. Id. This last provision suggests that even though Rule 1.6 is permissive, a
lawyer disclosing information without a reasonable belief is nevertheless subject to
discipline. The Rule is therefore not entirely permissive and not without disciplinary
consequences.
40. Id. (emphasis added). The merits of this "policy" will be discussed infra,
Section IV.
41. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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2. Case B
Same as case A except that the lawyer, firmly and reasonably
believing the client has been dissuaded from carrying out his plan,
does not disclose the information. The client carries out the plan
successfully. Model Rules Analysis: Same as Case A.
3. Case C
Same as Case B except that the lawyer, believing the client has
been dissuaded, discloses the information. Model Rules Analysis:
Because he lacked the requisite belief, the lawyer acted unethically
and is subject to discipline.
4. Case D
Same as Case A except that the lawyer, still believing that the
client will carry out his plan, does not disclose the client's intention,
and the client carries out the plan successfully. Model Rules Analysis:
The lawyer has not violated the Rule by not disclosing and is not
subject to discipline.
5. Analysis
Cases A and B represent responsible lawyers acting within the
scope of the Rule. Although, through hindsight, it is evident that
both lawyers' beliefs were wrong, their decisions to disclose were
ethical because they acted on beliefs that were reasonable under the
circumstances. 42 Case C, on the other hand, represents an unethical
lawyer who violated the Rule by making a disclosure not based on
a reasonable belief. Cases A through C illustrate varying consequences
likely to result from application of Rule 1.6.
Case D poses more of a problem. The decision not to disclose
in Case D was made despite the fact that the lawyer's reasonable
belief would have made disclosure ethically proper. The question,
then, is whether the decision not to disclose was an exercise of
professional discretion. To answer that question, the elements of
the concept of discretion need clarification.
B. The Concept of Discretion
For the purposes of this Article, discretion can best be defined
42. The text of Rule 1.6 does not require the belief to be "reasonable." But
see supra note 29 and accompanying text; infra note 51 and accompanying text.
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FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
in relation to two types of non-discretionary decisions. The first
type involves what may be loosely called the "total freedom" de-
cision. One who orders dinner in a restaurant is wholly free to
choose anything on the menu. But one would not say that the diner
has "discretion" to choose anything on the menu because "discre-
tion" implies a decision made within restrictive bounds.43 Limits are
precisely what is missing from the diner's situation. 44
A second category of non-discretionary decision is the "total duty"
decision. This type of decision is made in situations where one is
morally or legally obligated to do or refrain from doing something.
For example, one must support one's family, file an income tax
return, and avoid hurting others. Although it is technically true that
one is "free" to break the law or act immorally, provided one is
prepared to suffer the consequences, it cannot be said that one has
discretion regarding the decisions to support one's family or file an
income tax return. No true freedom exists in these instances because
flouting the law or morality involves a nonchalant attitude rather
than the responsible exercise of freedom that discretion imports. 45
Discretion is therefore out of place in contexts where either total
freedom or a pre-existing duty exists. The essence of discretion is
"freedom within bounds." ' 46 The restaurant and tax-filing decisions
do not involve discretion; the first allows too much freedom and
the second too little.41
In light of this definition, discretion applies to disclosure cases
but not necessarily to instances of non-disclosure. Plainly, as in
43. This assumes that discretion is by definition "limited." See infra note 60
and accompanying text. "[Dliscretion [is] bounded by the rules and principles of
law, and [is] not arbitrary, capricious, or unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of
a judicial whim, but the exercise of judicial judgment .... .. " BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 419 (5th ed. 1979); cf. Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision:
The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 365
n.30 (1975) ("When a person's choice is not constrained at all we would not
ordinarily use the term 'discretion.' We say an official has 'discretion' to pick
employees for a company, but we do not say a child has 'discretion' to choose
the flavor of ice cream he wants.") [hereinafter cited as Greenawalt].
44. For the purposes of the diner's decision, assume that considerations of
health or affordability are not applicable "bounds" within which a responsible
decision "must" be made, despite the fact that such considerations are often
uppermost in the minds of many diners.
45. An analysis of discretion should also consider civil disobedience, which is
an act by an individual who disobeys the law out of conscience. In a sense, the
individual acts responsibly, and within the bounds of discretion as such bounds
may be defined by various political philosophies.
46. See infra note 47.
47. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1978) ("[d]iscretion, like
the hole in a doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding
belt of restriction") [hereinafter cited as DWORKIN].
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hypothetical Case A, 48 if a lawyer decides to disclose confidential
information relating to a client's criminal intent to cause imminent
death or substantial bodily harm, Rule 1.6 would permit disclosure
only if the lawyer reasonably believes it is necessary to prevent the
crime which he reasonably believes his client will commit. The concept
of discretion applies because the two essential elements of a dis-
cretionary decision, freedom and limits on that freedom, are present.
On the other hand, a lawyer is liable to discipline, as in Case C,
if he discloses information without reasonably believing the client
will commit a crime. 49 Such a lawyer has abused the grant of
discretion. °
Similarly, a decision not to disclose may fall within the discre-
tionary bounds of the Rule. For example, as in Case B, a lawyer
who reasonably concludes that disclosure is not necessary to prevent
a client's criminal act is justified under the Rule regardless of the
client's future acts. But in situations like Case D where the lawyer
reasonably believes, perhaps beyond a reasonable doubt," that dis-
closure is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury and
still chooses not to disclose, the concept of discretion in Rule 1.6
breaks down. It becomes unintelligible from the points of view of
both logic and morality. Indeed, these four hypothetical cases show
that Rule 1.6 is, at best, perplexing.
The conditions under which a lawyer may or may not disclose
are defined by Rule 1.6, and Cases A, B and C illustrate the
application of these conditions. But the Rule provides no guidance
as to the conditions under which a lawyer may choose non-disclosure
even though he reasonably believes that death or substantial bodily
injury will occur, as in Case D. There is no indication whether there
are any conditions under which the Case D decision could ethically
be made. 52
48. See supra Section II.A. Hereafter the reader is referred to Section II.A
whenever the text refers to Cases A, B, C, or D.
49. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
51. The CODE, supra note 4, provides in DR 4-101(C)(3) that a lawyer may
reveal "Ithe intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary
to prevent the crime." Id. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314
(1965), "indicates that such disclosure may not be made 'unless the facts in the
attorney's possession indicate beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be com-
mitted.' " ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 178 (1979). Although
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct are not annotated as of the date of this
writing, Rule 1.6(b)(1) may also be construed to require a "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard. Cf. Section VII, infra; see also supra note 29 for a discussion
of the meaning of "belief" and "reasonable belief" in Rule 1.6.
52. Cf. Section IV.
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In Case D, the lawyer's non-disclosure is similar to the diner's
decision in the restaurant. Whatever the bases of their decisions, no
result can be criticized for there are no bounds within which the
lawyer or the diner must decide. However, unlike the diner, who
is free to choose any meal, whether it advances or defeats the goals
of health or pleasure, the lawyer, given the life-threatening circum-
stances of Case D, has professional "license" to disclose nothing.
One is therefore forced to conclude that Rule 1.6 provides no effective
"bounds of discretion" in some cases of non-disclosure. 3
It follows that the comment to Rule 1.6 is inaccurate when it
says that lawyers have "professional discretion" to disclose infor-
mation. For without limiting that discretion, there is no discretion,
professional or otherwise. The Rule is therefore ineffective at best,
irrational at worst. Since Rule 1.6, as part of a body of rules of
ethics, must be coherent and rational in order to function, it should
not be endorsed.5 4
III. The Test of Legal Philosophy
The discretion given the lawyer in Case D is similar to what has
been called "strong discretion"55 in describing judicial decisions in
53. In discussing the CODE provision DR 4-10l(C)(3), which permits a lawyer
to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime ...," one commentator
observed that "[t]here is little guidance as to how the lawyer is to exercise the
discretion to report future crimes." FREEDMAN, supra note 19, at 6. He then states,
without any supporting argument, that "[it seems clear that the lawyer should
reveal information necessary to save a life." Id. While this conclusion may be
valid, it cannot be derived from the CODE or Rule 1.6. For a similar conclusion,
see HAZARD, supra note 1, at 28-29.
54. This presumes that ethical principles are known and defended principally
through reason, although the role of intuition and moral feelings also play an
important role in the development of ethics. See, e.g., K. BALER, THE MORAL POINT
OF VIEW: A RATIONAL BASIS OF ETHICS 138-62 (1958; abr. ed. 1965); J. RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 47-53ff (1971) [hereinafter cited as RAWLS] D. RICHARDS,
THE MORAL CRITICISM OF LAW 105-06 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RICHARDS].
55. "Strong discretion" describes a situation where an official charged with
making decisions is not bound by standards governing the process of decision-
making. For example, a sergeant who has been told to pick any five men for
patrol has strong discretion because there are no standards to guide his choice. In
contrast, if the sergeant has been told to pick five experienced men for patrol, his
choice is limited by the standard of experience, making his discretion "weak."
DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 32. Strong discretion is therefore like the "total
freedom" decision discussed supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. On the
other hand, restricted decision-making implies weak discretion or perhaps no dis-
cretion at all. That would be the "total duty" decision decribed supra notes 45-
47 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the distinction between strong and
weak discretion, see DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 31-32.
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"hard cases." '56 Hard cases are those in which judges are presented
with issues to which no prior rule is readily or easily applicable.17
In such cases, it has been argued, judges must exercise their "dis-
cretion" by reaching beyond the law to make new law. 8 In so
doing, they are not bound by pre-existing rules or standards, hence
their "strong" discretion. 9
This analogy is flawed, however, because it fails to recognize that
all discretionary decisions may be criticized, if not by contrast with
precedent or other legal authority, then certainly by reference to
standards of rationality, efficiency and fairness. 6° Even where no
clear rule applies, judges are bound to decide cases on the basis of
principle-not whim, prejudice or dubious policy grounds. 61 Thus,
even if a decision not to disclose can be defended on the ground
of "strong discretion," it must also be rational and fair. However,
the Rule provides no insight into its standards of either rationality62
or fairness. 63
56. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, ch. 4 (Hard Cases).
57. Id. at 81. It is tempting to identify "hard cases" with cases of "first
impression" which present novel issues never before raised. However, novelty does
not necessarily entail difficulty; in some cases a novel issue may be easily decided
by a slight extension of a prior rule. In contrast, a "hard case" is one in which
no clear or settled rule can be appropriated to dispose of the novel issue. Thus,
although all hard cases are by definition cases of first impression, not all cases
of first impression are hard cases. But cf. Parent, Interpretation and Justification
in Hard Cases, 15 GA. L. REV. 99 (1980) (hard decisions are those that "cannot
be made with ... logical certainty and precision .... usually because either pertinent
legal standards are in need of interpretation or no standards seem pertinent." Such
decisions allow judicial creativity and test "the intellectual and moral faculties of
our judges.") [hereinafter cited as Parent.].
58. This is Dworkin's characterization of a key provision of H.L.A. Hart's
legal positivism. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 17, 35; H.L.A. HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 138-44 (1961) [hereinafter cited as HART]. For a definition of
legal positivism, see infra note 120 and sources cited therein.
59. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 34.
60. Id. at 33.
61. Id. at 84-86; see Feld and Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick
and Cabot, 312 Pa. Super. 125, 458 A.2d 545 (1983), appeal dismissed,- Pa.-,
470 A.2d 525 (1984) (where lawyers raise in pari delicto defense in preliminary
objections to clients' allegations of professional malpractice and breach of contract,
court refuses to follow in pari delicto doctrine, because founded on uncertain public
policy choices, relying instead on principle that no court will lend aid to one whose
action is based on immoral or illegal act). DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 83-84,
argues that judicial decisions in hard cases should be based on principle, not policy.
This is a controversial issue that cannot be examined fully here. For a position
contrary to Dworkin's, see Greenawalt, Policy, Rights and Judicial Decisions, 11
GA. L. REV. 991, 992 (1977). For a reply to Greenawalt, see DWORKIN, supra note
47, at 295-327.
62. See supra Section II.
63. See infra Section IV.
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Regardless of the acceptability of "strong discretion" on grounds
of legal theory, the analogy to judicial discretion is flawed for other
reasons. Since the Rule provides unambiguous criteria for deciding
when disclosure is ethical and when it is not, it is simply false to
argue that the lawyer is faced, as many judges certainly are, with
a hard case with no clear rules to guide him. The question therefore
remains: Why is the non-disclosing lawyer free to ignore the per-
missive disclosure rule even when it applies? That lawyers are simply
permitted to ignore it is a puzzle that calls for an explanation.
The same analysis applies to two other meanings of "strong
discretion." According to the first, discretion is appropriate wherever
judges and lawyers find that there is no right answer to a legal or
ethical problem. 64 In such a situation no party would have a right
to a particular decision. According to the second meaning, discretion
is required wherever more than one decision could result from a
sincere and responsible effort to reach the right decision. 65 Here,
too, no party would have a right to a particular decision. These
meanings of strong discretion present possible justifications for non-
disclosure in situations like Case D. 66 Yet both are flawed for the
reasons that follow.
First, Rule 1.6 was not intended to apply to situations where there
is no right answer.67 The comment to the Rule certainly contemplates
situations in which "[i]t is very difficult for a lawyer to 'know'
when such a heinous purpose will actually be carried out, for the
client may have a change of mind." ' 68 However, the Comment merely
recognizes that the lawyer's discretion, restricted by the Rule's dis-
closure criteria, can be very difficult to exercise; but it does not
mean that there is no right answer. A fair reading of the Rule
suggests that a lawyer applying the Rule makes a decision that in
his judgment is "right," based on available information. To say
that the Rule authorizes either of two judgments, neither of which
64. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 43, at 381-86; Parent, supra note 57.
65. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 327-30. See generally Greenawalt, supra
note 43, at 139-41 (discussing judicial discretion in deciding cases); Parent, supra
note 57, at 99-141 (discussing judicial discretion and rejecting Dworkin's views on
the subject).
66. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
67. The thesis that there is "no right answer" to a legal question is extremely
controversial and will not be examined here. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 279-
90; Greenawalt, supra note 43, at 366-68; Parent, supra note 57, at 113-17. Although
parties often settle their cases out of court on the assumption that there is "no
right answer" to their disputes, such decisions would appear to depend more on
psychological and strategic considerations than on philosophical principles, which
are the subject of Dworkin's discussion. DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 279-90.
68. RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6 comment.
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is "right," would vitiate the either/or nature of the ethical problem
facing the lawyer: either there are grounds for a reasonable belief
that a client will cause death or injury or there are not. The Rufd
does not allow for a third alternative.
Second, it is true that a sincere and responsible decision-making
effort can often result in more than one appropriate outcome. 69 But
this is an acceptable version of a weaker form of discretion 70 that
is well-known in judicial and legal circles, 7' and it is the kind of
discretion that the Rule properly mandates. For the duty of a judge
or lawyer faced with a Rule 1.6 problem is defined by standards
that reasonable persons can interpret differently. 72 For example, both
the disclosing lawyer in Case A and the non-disclosing lawyer in
Case B made "wrong" but ethical decisions. 73 Faced with the same
situations, other lawyers might have reached "right" decisions.7 4
However, their decisions would not have been more ethical than
those of the first two lawyers because their reasonable beliefs (prod-
ucts of sincere and responsible judgments) would have differed. Of
course the possibility that there may be different results 'does not
mean that they all are equally sound. The decision reached by the
lawyer in Case C was plainly unethical.75
69. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 327-30; Greenawalt, supra note 43, at 363-
66; Parent, supra note 57, at 141.
70. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. It is "weaker" because the
decision-maker, the lawyer, is constrained to make his decision in accordance with
certain standards. This constraint is absent in strong discretion contexts.
71. For example, a trial court has weak discretion in imposing a sentence in
a criminal case. See supra note 55; Greenawalt, supra note 43, at 363-65. Although
an appellate panel may not necessarily agree with the sentence imposed, it will not
reverse except where there has been an abuse of discretion, for example, ignoring
standards set forth in a sentencing code. Nevertheless, presented with the same
case, two trial judges could impose disparate sentences by applying and interpreting
the sentencing code differently. This illustrates that the exercise of discretion involvesjudgment and is not a mechanical process. Indeed, variable results reflect differences
between those individuals who are making the decisions, rather than defects in the
judicial process. Nevertheless, both judges are required to base their decisions upon
the same standards. If they were at liberty to ignore or change the standards they
would not be exercising their discretion. Rather, they would have "license" or
freedom to decide without limits.
72. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 69.
73. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of hypothetical Cases A and B.
The decisions in those cases were "wrong" only in the sense that the judgments
(that the client would murder the judge in Case A or would not do so in Case
B) were in fact mistaken. The decisions were ethically "right," however, because
they were based on the attorneys' reasonable beliefs.
74. The designation of a decision as "right" or "wrong" merely reflects whether
the predicted result occurred. See. supra note 73.
75. See supra Section II.A for a discussion of hypothetical Case C. In that
case the lawyer's decision was not only unethical, but "wrong" from the point of
view of the outcome. See supra note 74.
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Redefining "discretionary decision" in light of the above discussion
indicates that it is a judgment restricted by certain standards. These
standards dictate a process of decision-making rather than a particular
result. The lawyer must assess a situation and reach a decision in
conformity with these standards. Insofar as Rule 1.6 authorizes Case
D, our objection to it can now be rephrased: The Rule permits a
lawyer to either forego the judgmental process, or to go through
the process and ignore the standards governing the process or the
results to which the process reasonably leads. The Rule cannot,
therefore, be justified by legal philosophy.
IV. The Test of Ethics
A. Policy and Utilitarianism
Even if there were not grave problems with Rule 1.6 because of
its reliance on "professional discretion'' 76 and its potential reliance
on legal philosophy, 77 it might be argued that the strongest defense
of the Rule is based on policy grounds. The Preamble to the proposed
Rules states that the lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose
should not be the subject of re-examination; "permitting such re-
examination would be incompatible with the general policy of pro-
moting compliance with law through assurances that communications
will be protected against disclosure."178
If the Rule is premised on confidentiality grounds, however, it is
objectionable. Although valid, the principle that confidentiality pro-
motes compliance with law is not served where attorneys are permitted
to disclose confidential communications. If the policy is to have any
weight at all, it must not be discarded by lawyers who have a
reasonable belief that a client will cause death or serious bodily
injury. If prevention of death or injury is an exception to the general
policy, however, that exception ought not be ignored by the lawyer
who chooses to protect his client's confidence, as, for example, in
Case D. In short, either promoting the policy of confidentiality has
greater weight than preventing death or injury, or it is meaningless.
But if the policy is more important, the purpose behind lawyers'
"professional discretion" to disclose would be vitiated. Regardless
of one's point of view, no sense can be made of the policy underlying
76. See supra Section II.
77. See supra Section III.
78. RULES, supra note 2, Preamble.
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Rule 1.6. If the policy is merely one more component of an "epistle
of straw, ' 79 then lawyers are simply free to believe it or not, and
this analysis can conclude on that agnostic note. This Article assumes
however, that the Rule is founded on rational considerations.
An alternative policy rationale exists in support of Rule 1.6. While
superficially useful for advocates of the Rule, this rationale is actually
strong evidence against it, as is shown by the following analysis.
The introduction to the comment to Rule 1.6 states that, "[biased
upon experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the
advice given, and the law is upheld." 0 Even though the Rules offer
no proof that this is so,8 let us assume that almost all clients follow
their lawyers' advice. The comment also states, under "Disclosure
Adverse to Client," that
to the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's
purposes, the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which
would enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful course of
conduct. The public is better protected if full and open com-
munication by the client is encouraged than if it is inhibited.8 2
Even if we could ignore the virtually insuperable problem of
reconciling the weight that is attributed to the policy with the bald fact
that lawyers may freely ignore it, these two statements together establish
that the underlying ethic of the Rule is utilitarianism."
Utilitarianism holds that right conduct is that which promotes the
greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.8 4 As one of
the great philosophies of modern times, the complex doctrine of
utilitarianism is embodied in two major schools of thought: act
utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Neither of these schools of
thought justifies Rule 1.6.
Act utilitarianism holds that one should perform that act which
79. See supra notes 20 & 25 and accompanying text.
80. RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6 comment.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See infra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
84. Bentham described the Principle of Utility as the fundamental axiom ac-
cording to which "[i]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the
measure of right and wrong." J. Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 221-95 (J. Bowring ed. 1962). Mill's definition is
similar. "Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right
in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of
pain; by unhappiness, pain, and privation of pleasure." J.S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM
257 (World Publishing Co. 1962) (1861) [hereinafter cited as MILL].
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will cause the greatest good for everyone affected by the act. 5 This
form of utilitarianism rejects absolute rules such as those against
killing, stealing, and lying.86 What makes an act ethical, according
to this doctrine, is not its conformity with a rule but its consequences
in particular situations.17 If an act produces a generally "good"
result, the action is right regardless of its agreement with a general
rule.88 For example, if one lies to an assassin about the location of
an intended victim, the lie produces a good result by saving the
victim's life. Under act utilitarianism, Case D is not justifiable, since
the putative result of the failure to disclose is death without any
redeeming, greater good. There remains only the hope either that
future lawyers will dissuade clients from such conduct, or that most
clients will be dissuaded in Case D situations.
Rule utilitarianism provides a better rationale for Rule 1.6. It holds
that one should always follow the rule or rules which will bring
about the greatest good for the greatest number of people.8 9 Thus,
an action is right by virtue of its conformity to a rule. Although
a rule is chosen because actions in accordance with it are expected
to generally produce good consequences, bad consequences will not
defeat the ethical nature of the conduct. 9° Under rule utilitarianism,
the rightness of an action is derived from following rules. 91
Rule utilitarianism commonly underlies legal rules. Many proce-
dural court rules are based on the reasonable belief that the admin-
istration of justice will be fairer and more efficient in the long run
if, for example, parties are required to file complaints and appeals
within specific time limitations. Such rules may seem like a victory
of form over substance since many parties will lose or waive their
substantive rights by default. Yet, justice and its administration would
surely be compromised without procedural rules.
85. See ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS 6-8 (Beauchamp & Bowie eds. 1979).
86. Id. at 7.
87. Id. at 7-8.
88. Id.
89. Id.; see also J. NARVESON, MORALITY AND UTILITY 16, 124 (1967); RICHARDS,
supra note 54, at 234-35, 270.
90. This is the author's interpretation of a possible consequence of rule utili-
tarianism. For a contrary view, see RICHARDS, supra note 54, at 234-35. There are
many forms of utilitarianism. The problems raised by them, although important,
cannot be treated here. For a discussion of classical utilitarianism, see RAWLS,
supra note 54, at 22-27 and the references cited therein at 22 n.9.
91. Rule 1.6 would be a model of rule utilitarianism if it prohibited lawyers
from disclosing client confidences in situations such as Case D. The comment to
Rule 1.6 states that "almost all clients follow the advice given [by lawyers]."
RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6 comment. If this premise is true, then a lawyer is
at least theoretically ethical when he follows the example of Case D, even though
it results in bad consequences.
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However, utilitarianism cannot be made into a master rule gov-
erning all ethical situations, particularly the situation of the non-
disclosing lawyer in Case D. The lawyer in Case D cannot be
analogized to a court or other institution which seeks overall effi-
ciency and fairness because the situations are incomparable. The
client whose claim is dismissed for failure to conform to a procedural
rule is still alive and may have grounds for redress from a negligent
lawyer, for example in a malpractice action. The lawyer's decision
in Case D, however, may determine whether an individual lives or
dies. Moreover, there are other flaws to this analogy. Less apparent
is the fact that persons subject to rule utilitarianism are generally
aware of how their rights may be affected by following or not
following rules. 92 More generally, legitimate expectations, indeed life
opportunities, are often built on the somewhat arbitrary bases of
entrance exams, deadlines, personal appearance and a thousand other
"rules" that contribute to success or failure in life. But seldom is
one's bodily safety or life so acutely dependent on another's exercise
of an inscrutable "discretion." Rarely, if ever, does society delib-
erately deposit in either a public servant or a private entrepreneur
the unreviewable discretion and awesome power to determine whether
others may continue to enjoy life and liberty.91
92. Procedural rules are promulgated and give notice to parties. In many
jurisdictions courts are required by statute to inform parties of their rights to
appeal and of the applicable time limits. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2)
(notification to defendant of right to appeal).
93. Although there is no legal duty in the United States to aid an individual
in peril, there is general agreement that one has a moral obligation to help. Prosser
states:
[T]he law has persistently refused to recognize the moral obligation of
common decency and common humanity, to come to the aid of another
human being who is in danger, even though the outcome is to cost him
his life. Some of the decisions have been shocking in the extreme. The
expert swimmer, with a boat and a rope in hand, who sees another
drowning before his eyes, is not required to do anything at all about
it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and watch the man
drown. A physician is under no duty to answer the call of one who is
dying and might be saved, nor is anyone required to play the part of
Florence Nightingale and bind up the wounds of a stranger who is
bleeding to death, or to prevent a neighbor's child from hammering on
a dangerous explosive, or to remove a stone from the highway where it
is a menace to traffic, or a train from a place where it blocks a fire
engine on its way to save a house or even to cry a warning to one who
is walking into the jaws of a dangerous machine. The remedy in such
cases is left to the "higher law" and the "voice of conscience," which,
in a wicked world, would seem to be singularly ineffective either to
prevent the harm or to compensate the victim. Such decisions are revolting
to any moral sense. They have been denounced with vigor by legal
writers.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 340-41 (4th ed. 1971).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XIII
Should the Case D lawyer draw up a balance sheet of good and
bad consequences, a preposterous calculus emerges. Most shocking
is the notion that the lawyer is allowed to determine consequences
for abstract and distant others while, at the same time, he is permitted
to ignore the real victims which will be produced by his "benefi-
cence." The greatest good for the greatest number may, therefore,
be nothing more than the greatest good for an unknown majority
of the future. 94
Only the crudest forms of utilitarianism are vulnerable to the
classic objection that utilitarianism sacrifices the lives of innocent
persons for the benefit of others. 95 Unfortunately, Rule 1.6 is a crude
94. Legislatures frequently must weigh relative "good results." Whether courts
must also do so is controversial. See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at 83-84. Since
public funding of health research is limited, for example, the funding of research
which benefits the greatest number of people may be justified. If research on a
rare disease is funded, however, some people may be cured of that disease in the
future. This result simply illustrates that the government cannot commit itself to
fund all health research immediately or simultaneously, but must choose a limited
number of projects for funding. In any case, it is doubtful that those who contract
an unresearched disease have a right to funding for such research. Failure to conduct
research which might save unspecified lives in the future is quite distinct from
failure to aid an individual in peril. The differences concern the specificity of the
identity of the persons and the causal connections involved. See Wasserstrom, On
the Morality of War. A Preliminary Inquiry, in WAR AND MORALITY 78, 97 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as WAR AND MORALITY]. Even if it is theoretically impossible to
distinguish the failure to disclose in Case D from the failure to fund health research,
as a practical matter it is necessary to draw a line beyond which liability will not
lie. Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928)
(Andrews, J., dissenting) ("[w]hat we do mean by the word 'proximate' [cause]
is, that because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the
law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point").
95. Evidence that even Bentham's highly regarded Principle of Utility, supra
note 84, may be viewed in this light, however, is found in the remarks of a
distinguished philosopher of law:
Utilitarianism, which for long was regarded as the sober, workmanlike
English manifestation of the European Enlightenment and which was
certainly the fountain of great reforms of the archaic English legal system
as well as the inspiration of progressive thought in England and elsewhere,
is now seen by many thinkers to have a darker, more sinister side,
licensing anything to be done to individuals, condoning any sacrifice, in
the pursuit of the ultimate goal of maximizing the aggregate or average
welfare of a community. Moreover, much of the most interesting current
work among American political philosophers-and I am thinking here
of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice and Robert Nozick's Anarchy,
State, and Utopia-is not only frankly hostile to Utilitarianism but
identifies as Utilitarianism's cardinal sin its failure to recognize that the
division of humanity into separate individuals is a fact of great moral
importance which confers on certain interests of individuals a title to
inviolability to be maintained even where to maintain it may reduce the
level of aggregate or average welfare below that which could otherwise
be achieved.
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form of utilitarianism. 96 But the great utilitarian philosopher, John
Stuart Mill, the author of On Liberty" and The Subjection of
Women,98 had the deepest respect for justice and the rights of
individuals.9 9 Mill wrote:
In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete
spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by,
and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal per-
fection of utilitarian morality. . . . In the case of abstinences
indeed-of things which people forbear to do from moral con-
siderations, though the consequences in the particular case might
be beneficial-it would be unworthy of an intelligent agent not
to be consciously aware that the action is of a class which ...
would be generally injurious, and that this is the ground of the
obligation to abstain from it.100
The difficulty with utilitarianism lies in uniting its central insight,
"the greatest good for the greatest number," with the equally im-
portant thesis that utility must be compatible with individual rights,
as argued by Mill.' 0 A lawyer who refuses to disclose vital infor-
mation affecting the safety of others is like an experimental scientist
who performs dangerous experiments or surgery on ten persons in
the hope of saving ten million later. Even if the scientist could be
assured in advance that good consequences would flow from the
surgery, our moral disapproval would not be altered. We must protect
rights, or we will destroy the very foundations of Justice.102
H.L.A. Hart, Law in the Perspective of Philosophy: 1776-1976, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV.
538, 541 (1976).
96. This conclusion is reinforced by a statement contained in the Final Draft
of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. "To the extent a lawyer is
prohibited from making disclosure, the interests of the potential victim are sacrificed
in favor of preserving the client's confidences even though the client's purpose is
wrongful." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Final Draft, reprinted in 68
A.B.A.J. 1411 (1982) (emphasis added) (at 9 of pullout supplement; Disclosure
Adverse to Client). This statement was deleted, however, in the draft which was
proposed and adopted at the August, 1983 ABA meeting of the House of Delegates.
See RULES, supra note 2.
97. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
98. J.S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869).
99. For an analysis of Mill's utilitarianism, see Mabbott, Interpretations of
Mill's "Utilitarianism," 6 PHIL. Q. 115-20 (1956), reprinted in THEORIES OF ETHICS
137-43 (P. Foot ed. 1967).
100. MILL, supra note 84, at 268, 270.
101. Id. at 270.
102. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 3-4.
Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of
thought. A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or
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Cost-benefit analysis'03 may be appropriately employed in the ex-
treme situations of war or natural disaster when military leaders and
doctors must make immediate and difficult choices to attain victory
or save lives."l 4 In contrast, the lawyer's "triage" under Rule 1.6
is inappropriate: as in Case D, a judge will be sacrificed today to
save, perhaps, another two in a hundred years, or maybe never.
The impossibility of predicting the future is not the only problem.
Even if the future were known, an ethic which authorizes lawyers
to sacrifice a client's victim merely because most clients, uninhibited
by the threat of disclosure, will follow their lawyers' advice would
be disturbing. 105
B. When Disclosure is Ethically Required
The policies promoting "compliance with law' 1 °6 and utility'0 7 do
revised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are
unjust. Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that
even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason
justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a
greater good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices
imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed
by many. Therefore, in a just society the liberties of equal citizenship
are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to
political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests. The only thing
that permits us to acquiesce in an erroneous theory is the lack of a
better one; analogously, an injustice is tolerable only when it is necessary
to avoid an even greater injustice. Being first virtues of human activities,
truth and justice are uncompromising.
Id.
103. In economics, the source of the concept of cost-benefit analysis, the benefits
and costs of a policy are defined primarily by the effect of the policy on some
fundamental objectives of the economy. RAY, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: ISSUES AND
METHODOLOGIES 9 (1984). Cost-benefit analysis invariably attempts to describe and
quantify the social advantages and disadvantages of a policy in terms of money.
For example, building a new highway entails construction and maintenance costs
which are disadvantages to society. The benefits of the new highway consist of
such things as shorter traveling time, reduction in highway congestion, and time
saved, which may be translated into monetary values. See D. PEARCE, COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 8-9 (1971).
104. See, e.g., WAR AND MORALITY, supra note 94, at 78-101.
105. However, this ethic is a tacit assumption of the Rules. See RULES, supra
note 2. The author has not found any research supporting the claim that "[biased
on experience, lawyers know that almost all clients follow the advice given [by
lawyers], and the law is upheld." Id. Comment. On the contrary, that claim is
somewhat counter-intuitive inasmuch as a client, once assured that his lawyer will
not disclose his criminal plan, may have even more reason to commit the crime.
He knows not only that the lawyer will remain silent, but he may also have
inadvertently obtained advice on how to cover up the crime.
106. See supra Section IV.A for a discussion of these policies.
107. Id.
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not provide a defensible ethical basis for determining a lawyer's
duty to maintain the confidentiality of his client. Policy arguments
are rarely advanced unless other arguments fail. 108 Considering Case
D situations from the client's point of view, the client may have
an antecedent right to keep a criminal plan secret. This introduces
a consideration foreign to the Rule's Preamble and the comment
to Rule 1.6, which speak solely in terms of policy.'0 9 If, however,
the client has a right ab initio to expect confidentiality, then Rule
1.6 would be on more solid ethical ground. But if the client does
not have such a right, rejection of the rule would be strongly
indicated. In such a case, the Rule could resort to neither policy
grounds nor grounds of principle for its justification.
A client must have some right to expect his lawyer to keep past
crimes secret because, in securing legal representation, the client
seeks an ally who will shield him from the harm that disclosure
would bring. Without such a right, legal representation in our ad-
versary system would be literally meaningless. A defense attorney
could, by sheer fiat, turn on the client as a prosecutor. Therefore,
a client's right to confidentiality must be included in the rationale
for supporting lawyer non-disclosure of information relating to past
crimes. 10 Details aside, both the present Code and the new Rules
agree on that premise. Otherwise, the adversary system could not
exist. '''
On the other hand, there appear to be no substantial arguments
in favor of lawyer non-disclosure of future crimes. Beyond counseling
108. See Feld and Sons, Inc. v. Pechner, Dorfman, Wolfee, Rounick and Cabot,
312 Pa. Super. 125, 134, 458 A.2d 545, 550 (1983) (quoting Richardson v. Mellish,
130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (Burrough, J.)), appeal dismissed, -Pa. -, 470 A.2d
525 (1984).
109. See RULES, supra note 2, Preamble and Rule 1.6 comment.
110. The CODE provides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a confidence
or secret of his client." CODE, supra note 4, DR 4-101(b) (1). The language of this
provision applies to past and future crimes. However, DR 4-101(C)(3) permits
disclosure for future crimes. Similarly, Rule 1.6(B)(1) provides an exception for
future crimes. RULES, supra note 2; see also ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 23,
at 55:901 ("A lawyer may not reveal information about a client's past criminal
or fraudulent behavior, other than that committed before a tribunal, which the
lawyer learns about in a confidential manner.").
111. This thesis is known as a "rights thesis." See DWORKIN, supra note 47, at
82-90 for a discussion of this concept. Although a "rights thesis" is a necessary
ingredient of the rationale for confidentiality, a third form of utilitarianism, "in-
stitution utilitarianism," could also provide a rationale. According to institution
utilitarianism, the adversary system as an institution leads to the greatest good,
because it encourages, for example, greater overall truthfulness in dispute resolutions
and fuller communications with lawyers. While this view is compatible with the
rights thesis advanced in this Article, utility is accepted only if it violates no other
right.
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the client not to commit the crime, the lawyer possesses no "rep-
resentative" capacity in such a matter." 2 Because representation in
this situation is impossible, the client has no right to expect con-
fidentiality. Consequently, the information is per se invalid." 3
Returning to the Case D illustration,' assume that the client,
whose case is going badly, makes an appointment with counsel solely
for the purpose of communicating the plan to murder the judge.
Suppose further that the client knows that the lawyer's hands are
tied by professional confidentiality." 5 Plainly, the client is no longer
using confidentiality as a lawful shield but as an avenging sword
to accomplish an unjust end. Additionally, there is no matter capable
of being "represented" by the lawyer until after the client has
accomplished the evil deed. One must conclude from this scenario
that the Case D client has no right to confidentiality. Consequently,
a lawyer has no duty to preserve confidentiality." 6
While the invalidity of a client's secret frees a lawyer from the
duty of confidentiality, not every invalid secret should be disclosed.
112. Under laws of evidence, no privilege attaches to a client's communication
regarding future crimes and frauds or crimes during the course of representation.
See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 44-45 (Proposed Final Draft May
30, 1981).
"In order that the [privilege] may apply there must be both professional
confidence and professional employment, but if the client has a criminal
object in view . . . one of these elements must necessarily be absent.
The client must either conspire with his [counsel] or deceive him. If his
criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his advisor profes-
sionally, because it cannot be the [lawyer's] business to further any
criminal object. If the client does not avow his object, he reposes no
confidence . . . . The [lawyer's] advice is obtained by a fraud." State
v. Phelps, 24 Or. App. 329, 545 P.2d 901, 904 (Or. Ct. App. 1976)
(quoting Queen v. Cox, [1884] 14 QBD 153, 168). Accord Gebhardt v.
United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 220 S.W. 677, 679 (Mo. 1920).
Id.; see also ABA/BNA MANUAL, supra note 23, at 55:902.
113. REGAN, supra note 12, at 99; see Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Duties and
Needs of an Advocate, in THE TABLE TALK AND OMMIANA OF SAMUEL TAYLOR
COLDERIDGE 140-41 (Ashe ed. 1888) ("There is undoubtedly a limit to the exertions
of an advocate for his client, [for] the advocate has no right, nor is it his duty,
to do that for his client which his client in foro conscientiae has no right to do
for himself.") [hererinafter cited as Coleridge].
114. See supra Section II.A.
115. Since Rule 1.6 permits disclosure under certain circumstances, the lawyer's
hands are not always "tied." See RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b). This fact has
caused much confusion regarding the policy grounds of the Rule. See supra notes
76-83 and accompanying text.
116. This conclusion presumes a Case D situation where the lawyer, after vig-
orously counseling the client not to commit the murder, has a reasonable belief
that the client will do so anyway. See BOK, supra note 33, at 124-31. "Most
theologians agree that certain types of secrets [are] not binding on professional
recipients, foremost among them grave threats against the public good or against
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For example, a client might tell his lawyer that the client does not
intend to file an income tax return in circumstances which clearly
require him to do so. The law will be broken, yet disclosure is not
necessarily required. 17 While the secret is invalid and the lawyer
cannot represent the client with respect to his criminal purpose, the
confidentiality of the communication is merely cancelled and dis-
closure is not required.
There are at least two situations in which a lawyer's disclosure
is required. The first occurs when the client's aggression is unjustly
directed against an innocent person. The aggression is unjust because
the victim has a right not to be killed. The second situation occurs
when direct and serious harm to the common good has been threat-
ened.1"' Either or both of these situations require disclosure. On
that principle, virtually every philosopher, from Plato and Aristotle
through Aquinas and Kant to Rawls, would agree." 9 Even the dis-
tinguished legal positivist,12o H.L.A. Hart, who advocated the sep-
aration of law and morals,12' recognized the necessity of a "minimum
content of natural law.' ' 2 2 Without rules condemning the use or
condonation of unjust aggression, "what point could there be for
beings such as ourselves in having rules of any other kind?" 12 3
While it is interesting to contemplate these philosophies, such a
discussion attributes to Rule 1.6 a value it does not merit. In addition
innocent third persons." Id.; see also COLERIDGE, supra note 113, at 140-41.
117. Although the Code would permit disclosure under these circumstances, the
proposed Rules would not, since Rule 1.6 limits permissible disclosures to crimes
leading to imminent death or substantial bodily injury. See CODE, supra note 4,
DR 4-101(c)(3); RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
118. See BOK, supra note 33, at 124-31.
119. See PLATO, GORGIAS (T. Irwin trans. 1979); THOMAS AQUINAS, SAINT, SUMMA
THEOLOGIAE vols. 1-60 (Blackfriars, London & McGraw-Hill, N.Y. 1964) (English
translation and original Latin text); I. KANT, ON THE FOUNDATION OF MORALITY
(B.E.A. Liddell trans. 1970); ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (H.G. Apostle trans.
1975); RAWLS, supra note 54.
120. Legal positivism is a complex doctrine or philosophy of law that has several
meanings. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593, 601-02 n.25 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Positivism], has
distinguished five meanings of "positivism" in contemporary jurisprudence: (1) laws
are commands of human beings; (2) there is no necessary connection between law
and morals or law as it is and as it ought to be; (3) the analysis of legal concepts
is worth pursuing in its own right; (4) a legal system is a "closed logical system"
in which correct legal decisions can be deduced logically from pre-existing legal
rules; (5) moral judgment cannot be established or defended as statements of facts
can, by rational argument, evidence or proof. See also W.G. FRIEDMAN, LEGAL THEORY
256-58 (1967); Walker, Positivism, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 969-70 (1980);
RICHARDS, supra note 54, at 11-23.
121. Positivism, supra note 120, at 593.
122. HART, supra note 58, at 189-95.
123. Id. at 190 (emphasis in original).
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to the many bases for criticism already advanced against the Rule,
the one that devaluates it the most is the provision in Rule 1.6(b)(2)
authorizing a lawyer to disclose information to collect a fee. 124
Whereas a Case D lawyer is free to withhold information relating
to an imminent death, he is also permitted to disclose information
to collect a fee. Surely lawyers have a right to make a living, and
perhaps certain disclosures may be justified in order to collect fees.
Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) suggest
that a small economic gain could have more intrinsic worth than
a human life. This possibility reflects poorly on the legal profession.
V. Reformulating the Rule
Although the permissive nature of Rule 1.6 may be criticized, an
absolute rule of mandatory disclosure would not be preferable.
Nevertheless, ethical principles would mandate disclosure when two
conditions are met: (1) the information communicated to the lawyer
is an invalid secret that cannot be the subject of legal representa-
tion; 25 and (2) the content of the invalid secret relates to unjust
aggression or is against the public good. 2 6 However, even these
conditions, while necessary, will not always be sufficient. For ex-
ample, a client's invalid secret and aggression may be justifiable
where they are necessary to avoid an even greater evil. Consider
the scenario where, in order to avoid an "imminent" nuclear war,
an individual performs acts that could cause death or substantial
bodily injuries. A lawyer would have to consider whether the in-
dividual's defenses of "justification" and "necessity" are valid rea-
sons which prohibit the lawyer's disclosure of the information.' 7
Better than Rule 1.6 is the following compromise between the man-
dafory and permissive disclosure schools of thought:
(1) A lawyer is required to disclose a client's intention to commit
124. Rule 1.6(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that a lawyer may reveal infor-
mation "to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client . . . ." RULES, supra note 2. The comment to
Rule 1.6 states that "[a] lawyer entitiled to a fee is permitted by paragraph (b)(2)
to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it." Id. comment (Dispute
Concerning Lawyer's Conduct).
125. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. See Commonwealth v. Capitolo,- Pa. Super.-, -, 471 A.2d 462, 468
(1984) (individuals charged with criminal trespass arising from demonstration against
nuclear power at nuclear power plant should have opportunity to prove through
expert testimony and documentary evidence that their conduct met requirements
of defense of justification).
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a crime when the client has no right to confidentiality and the lawyer
reasonably believes, based on clear and convincing evidence, that
disclosure is required to avoid unjustified conduct leading to death
or substantial injury to the rights or interests of others;
(2) A, lawyer is permitted to disclose a client's intention to commit
any other- crime when the client has no right to confidentiality and
the lawyer reasonably believes, based on clear and convincing evi-
dence, that disclosure is required to avoid criminal conduct that is
unjustified.
This proposed rule would establish that mandatory disclosure is
appropriate for crimes involving serious invasions of others' rights.
On the other hand, the current Rule mandates disclosure only to
protect bodily rights. Such a distinction indicates that the current
Rule imbues bodily rights with greater value than intellectual or
financial rights. Because a broken arm may be mended, but the
theft of a trade secret or one's life's savings may be more lasting
and more devastating, the better rule would protect against serious
invasions of rights.
With respect to the standard of evidence which must be met before
a lawyer could disclose, "clear and convincing," rather than "beyond
a reasonable doubt," 12 8 is sufficient. Unless the lower standard is
adopted, virtually no disclosures would ever have to be made, since
lawyers could always find a reasonable doubt to justify non-disclo-
sure.
Although valid arguments exist to support the view that all future
crimes should be disclosed, there are equally valid reasons for al-
lowing lawyers discretion to disclose where the rights of others and
the public good would not be seriously infringed. If section 2 were
adopted, however, it would be wise to define more precisely the
bounds of this discretion. This definition would be important if
reliance on "professional discretion" is to make any sense. 2 9
VI. Theory and Practice
Throughout this Article, criticism has been directed at the lawyer
who does not disclose his reasonable belief that a client will commit
murder or other serious crimes. Since the lawyer's decision in those
situations is neither justified by "professional discretion" nor sup-
ported by legal philosophy or ethics, Rule 1.6 should be reformulated
to require disclosure whenever clients have no right to confidentiality
128. See supra notes 29 & 51 and accompanying text.
129. See supra Sections II.B and III for discussions of "discretion."
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and their conduct would constitute unjustified aggression or seriously
invade the interests of others.
Arguably, even though the principles defended in this Article may
be theoretically valid, they are not practical because of the realities
of the attorney-client relationship. 30 The Case D situation may be
unrealistic because a lawyer faced with a client who begins to reveal
a criminal intent may respond in the following manner: "Listen. If
you've any intention of committing this crime I've got to warn you
that I may be obligated to disclose that information to the police.
You'd best forget about that." Of course, such a response is likely
to stop the sophisticated client from discussing the contemplated
crime any further. It may even lead the client to disavow the crime
completely, which is just what our practical lawyer may want, for
it relieves him of the burden of knowledge.
However, this strategy is open to two serious objections. First,
the lawyer is evading the open and full communication with the
client contemplated by the policies underlying Rule 1.6.131 Second,
the lawyer is merely making a token effort to "advise" the client,
since the advice given is designed either to end further discussion
of the criminal plan or to invite the client's deception by feigning
a change of mind. The only practicality served is obviously self-
serving: the lawyer retains a client and a fee by means of conduct
designed to make a "reasonable belief" extremely unlikely if not
impossible. This hypocrisy is only a specious adherence to the Rule.
Ethical principles, therefore, imply that the practicing lawyer can-
not be purely a pragmatist who reserves theory and principles for
the ethics classroom and expediently abandons them in order to "do
business."'132
The unsophisticated client who is not dissuaded by the lawyer
130. See I. Kant, On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, but
it Does Not Apply in Practice' in KANT'S POLITICAL WIjITINGS 61-92 (H. Reiss
ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as KANT].
131. See supra Section IV.A.
132. See KANT, supra note 130, at 62.
[No-one can pretend to be practically versed in a branch of knowledge
and yet treat theory with scorn, without exposing the fact that he is an
ignoramus in his subject. . . . Yet it is easier to excuse an ignoramus
who claims that theory is unnecessary and superfluous in his supposed
practice than a would-be expert who admits the value of theory for
teaching purposes, for example as a mental exercise, but at the same
time maintains that it is quite different in practice, and that anyone
leaving his studies to go out into the world will realize he has been
pursuing empty ideals and [a] philosopher's dreams-in short, that what-
ever sounds good in theory has no practical validity.
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from reciting his criminal plan creates even more of a "straw man"
situation than does the sophisticated client. Nevertheless, for the
criminal defense lawyer, this situation may be the veritable Achilles'
heel of a mandatory disclosure rule. He may contend that such
clients have a reasonable expectation that their criminal plans will
be held in confidence and that such expectations are simply the
price of doing business with those clients.'3 3 This argument is hope-
lessly transparent because the lawyer is, in essence, making a principle
out of the practice of the blind leading the sighted. The lawyer
becomes precisely Kant's ignoramus3 4 who not only rejects theory
but has the audacity to come back to the classroom and presume
to teach us that practice "can see further and more clearly with its
mole-like gaze fixed on experience than with the eyes which were
bestowed on a being designed to stand upright and to scan the
heavens."' 3 5
VII. Conclusion
A. The Rule as Written
The profession of law demands that its practitioners follow an
extremely demanding set of ethical rules 3 6 which are generally re-
flected in the Code and the Rules. Rule 1.6 is a major, and perhaps
the only significant, flaw in the legal profession's exceptional history
of self-discipline. The Rule fails the test of logic because the concept
of discretion which it reflects is self-contradictory. "' Legal philosophy
does not prevent this failure because it does not endorse a discretion
which is indistinguishable from license.' Most distressing of all,
Rule 1.6 is inconsistent with the general ethics which have shaped
Western concepts of rightness and goodness. By endorsing this crude
and indefensible form of utilitarianism, the drafters of Rule 1.6 have
exhibited a profound misunderstanding of our ethical heritage. 19
Rule 1.6 should not be adopted as proposed but should be amended
to reflect common ethical principles and the important policies that
would protect confidentiality. 40
133. This hypothesis is based on the author's conversations with criminal defense
lawyers.
134. See KANT, supra note 130, at 62.
135. Id. at 63.
136. See supra Introduction.
137. See supra Section II.B.
138. See supra Section III.
139. See supra Section IV.
140. See supra Section V.
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B. Looking Behind the Rule
Throughout this Article, Rule 1.6 has been addressed and criticized
as a rule of legal ethics. This discussion has presumed that the Rule
reflects the demands of ethics and professional responsibility rather
than extrinsic motives of a quasi-political nature which may have
influenced its final form and adoption. This presumption restricts
the analysis to the merits of the Rule and its accompanying comment.
However, such treatment risks misunderstanding the Rule.
Rule 1.6 was adopted in August of 1983 by the ABA House of
Delegates at the ABA's annual Convention. 14 Several amendments
to Rule 1.6 were proposed and considered by the House of Delegates
which finally adopted the amendments proposed by the American
College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL). 42 Although similar to the version
of Rule 1.6 which was formulated by the ABA Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards, the ACTL's amendments drast-
ically restricted the confidentiality exceptions that were set forth in
the Commission's Rule.143
During its discussions of the proposed Rules, there were at least
two conflicting forces at work within the ABA House of Delegates.144
One force favored mandatory disclosure of confidential material
under certain circumstances, while the other favored absolute con-
fidentiality. Rule 1.6, as a result, is a compromise that embodies
two antithetical concepts. The first concept appears in the text of
the Rule itself. Rule 1.6(b)(1) authorizes disclosure of a client's intent
to commit crimes that are likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily injury. 45 The disclosing lawyer must reasonably
believe that disclosure is necessary to prevent the client from com-
mitting these crimes. 46 The second concept, derived from the Pream-
ble and the comment to Rule 1.6, represents the underlying policy
of' the Rule and prohibits disclosure under all circumstances. 47 While
141. See 52 U.S.L.W. 2077 (1983).
142. See Comment, Proposed Rule 1.6, supra note 23, at 563.
143. Id. at 563.
144. Id.
145. RULES, supra note 2, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
146. Id. Rule 1.6(b).
147. Id. Preamble and Rule 1.6 comment. The comment to Rule 1.6 states:
[T]o the extent a lawyer is required or permitted to disclose a client's
purposes, the client will be inhibited from revealing facts which would
enable the lawyer to counsel against a wrongful course of action. The
public is better protected if full and open communication by the client
is encouraged than if it is inhibited.
Id. This policy statement is so strong that it could be used to justify an absolute
rule against disclosure, even when a lawyer is certain that a client is about to
DISCRETION AND UTILITY
the Rule calls for the exercise of discretion, the policy statement
does not. Indeed, the policy, being a prohibition, tends to negate
the force of the Rule.
In effect, Rule 1.6 represents two incompatible views. The per-
missive language of the text of the Rule accomodates the view which
favors disclosure. The policy statements accomodate the view which
would prohibit disclosure.
The discretion called for by the Rule cannot be applied to all
decisions. In some situations, as in Case D, the underlying policy
prohibiting disclosure applies instead, justifying the lawyer's apparent
"license" not to disclose. While the text of the Rule conforms to
ethical principles such as preventing serious harm intended by clients,
the policies expressed by the Rule's comment contravene these prin-
ciples by endorsing the twin goals of confidentiality and protection
of the public.
These conflicting concepts inherent in Rule 1.6 may be the result
of compromises made during the development of the Rule and its
comment. Nevertheless, they pose serious ethical problems. Moreover,
there are equally serious conceptual problems with the notion that
Rule 1.6 provides lawyers with guidance on how to make decisions
by exercising their discretion. It is hoped that the Bar will consider
these problems when evaluating Rule 1.6 for adoption.
commit murder, for the policy states unequivocally that "the public is better
protected" when clients can speak with assurance that their communications will
be held in confidence.
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